Portfolio Balance and the Assignment Problem in an Interdependent World by Enders, Walter & Lapan, Harvey
Economic Staff Paper Series Economics
1-1976






Follow this and additional works at: http://lib.dr.iastate.edu/econ_las_staffpapers
Part of the Economic Policy Commons, International Business Commons, Policy History,
Theory, and Methods Commons, and the Political Economy Commons
This Report is brought to you for free and open access by the Economics at Iowa State University Digital Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion
in Economic Staff Paper Series by an authorized administrator of Iowa State University Digital Repository. For more information, please contact
digirep@iastate.edu.
Recommended Citation
Enders, Walter and Lapan, Harvey, "Portfolio Balance and the Assignment Problem in an Interdependent World" (1976). Economic
Staff Paper Series. 156.
http://lib.dr.iastate.edu/econ_las_staffpapers/156
Portfolio Balance and the Assignment Problem in an Interdependent
World
Abstract
Central to the determination of the proper assignment of monetary and fiscal policy is the precise nature of
the role of international capital movements. Mundell's choice of assignments was based on his assumption
that capital movements represent sustainable flows, whereas recent work in portfolio theory has shown that
the demand for assets is a stock demand. Numerous papers have criticized Mundell for his specification of the
capital flow equation and, instead, argued that a change in the rate of return on an asset will lead to a
permanent change in desired asset stocks which can be accommodated by temporary asset flows.
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"Portfolio Balance and the Assignment Problem in an Interdependent World"
Mundell (1962) demonstrated that in order to achieve balance of payments
equilibrium and full employment, monetary policy should be paired with external
balance and fiscal policy with internal balance. The fundamental problem posed
by Mundell concerned the methods governmental authorities should utilize to
insure that both internal and external balance would be achieved when the
underlying structural parameters of the economy were unknown, Mundell argued
that Che assignment of monetary policy to external balance and fiscal policy to
internal balance followed from the Principle of Effective Market Classification
(Mundell 1962, 76): "Policies should be paired with objectives on which they
have the roost direct effect,"
The number of papers that have emerged from this original contribution
is an indication of the interest and importance of the problem posed by
Mundell. The papers which attempt to modify or extend Mundell's work do not
dispute the Principle of Effective Market Classification in the two target--
two instrument case,^ but seek to determine whether fiscal policy has the
most direct influence on internal balance and monetary policy on external
balance. Section I of this paper discusses the problems associated with
Mundell's formulation of the capital flow equation and the recent attempts to
rectify Mundell's formulation. In this section we also discuss some of the
logical problems encountered in dealing with the Assignment Problem for a
"small country". Section II develops a two country portfolio model which
views all asset demands as demands for stocks» and discusses the potential
assignments for monetary and fiscal policy. Section III, which contains
our principal results, discusses the stability of the various assignments
and how sterilization and debt management affect stability. A concluding
section summarizes our results, contrasts them with previous work and suggests
directions for further research.
*t"*
Section I - Introduction
Central to the determination of the proper assignment of monetary and
fiscal policy is the precise nature of the role of international capital
movements. Mundell's choice of assignments was based on his assumption
that capital movements represent sustainable flows, whereas recent work in
2
portfolio theory has shown that the demand for assets is a stock demand.
3
Numerous papers have criticized Mundell for his specification of the capital
flow equation and, instead, argued that a change in the rate of return on an
asset will lead to a permanent change in desired asset stocks which can be
accommodated by temporary asset flows. It is this transitory nature of
international capital flows which has led some authors, such as Levin (1972),
to argue that the Hundell assignment should be reversed.
As the portfolio approach to the balance of payments has led to the
recognition that capital flows are transitory in nature, it has also led
to the recognition that an Official Settlements deficit or surplus is also
a temporary phenomenon if the underlying system is stable. When money is
viewed as an asset in individual portfolios, it follows that a continual
change in the money stock--vla a balance of payments deficit or surplus
not fully sterilized by the monetary authortties--ts inconsistent with
equilibrium in a static economy. The direct implication, then, of the
portfolio approach to the balance of payments is that an Official Settle
ments surplus will be positively related to an Increase in the demand for
money, and negatively related to an Increase in the supply. Further, as a
balance of trade deficit (surplus) represents net dlssaving(saving) vis-
a-vis the rest of the world, a balance of trade deficit (surplus) represents
an excess supply (demand) for wealth.^ The relationships between money
market disequlllbrla and the balance of payments have recently been explored
by several papers concerned with the monetary theory of the balance of
payments,^ yet the relationships between the balance of trade and the excess
demand for wealth have not been adequately explored.
A distinction in the literature has been made between the continuing
flow effects versus stock shift effects,^ or what alternatively has been
g
called the scale effect versus the composition effect. The essential
distinction is that asset holders have two decisions to make concerning
their portfolios: the scale effect is concerned with the determinants of
desired portfolio size, while the composition effect is concerned with the
determinants of the asset mix within a portfolio of a given size. As the
determinants of the scale and composition decisions are not mutually exclu
sive, a change in the determinants of asset demands can normally be expected
to produce asset flows to accommodate both the realignment of the mix of
assets in a portfolio and the change in desired portfolio size.
Several authors have developed models in which the demand for assets
at a point in time (composition effect) are demands for stocks while port-
9
folio size is held constant throughout the analysis. Tsiang (1975)
developed a model in which international capital movements represent a
stock adjustment process in order to examine the importance of capital
flows in determining the proper assignment. However, he assumes that
savings, which represents a flow component of wealth, is a constant fraction
of income. In an economy without population or income growth, it is quite
paradoxical to state that the demands for the individual components of
wealth are demands for stocks but that individuals will accumulate these
10
stocks continually. By allowing asset holders to continually accumulate
assets, Tsiang finds--as did Mundell—that interest rate changes will
produce sustainable capital flows.
if
Thus, one purpose of this paper is to develop a portfolio model in which
the individual asset demands, as well as the demand for wealth, represent
stock decisions. The nature of the model, then, is such that if the
underlying structure of the economic system is stable, equilibrium will be
characterized by both balance of payments and balance of trade equilibrium*
As full stock equilibrium requires balance of trade and payments equilibrium,
Mundell's original question must be reformulated as the government need not
assign any of its policy tools to the balance of payments if the economic
system is stable. Our paper, then, attempts to answer the following two
questions:
1) When the possibility of instability exists, "What government
policies will assure convergence towards equilibrium?"
2) When the balance of payments is self-correcting, or when the
government pursues an assignment which guarantees stability,
"What policies act to increase the speed of adjustment?"
The distinction between portfolio size and composition effects suggests
that it is important to examine both the wealth creation effects of policy
instruments and the particular form in which they create wealth. For any
assignment of fiscal policy, we then determine whether the change in
government expenditures should be financed by changes in taxes, increases
in the stock of bonds or increases in the money stock,
We propose to study the Assignment Problem in a two country model.
The usual small country assumption greatly simplifies economic analysis
at the expense of relevance for large economic regions such as the U.S.,
EEC or U.K. Further, the properties of the "small country models" differ
from those of large countries. McKinnon (1968) shows that in a small
country portfolio model, fiscal policy has no permanent effects on the
level of income unless capital is immobile and the exchange rate is flexible
(i.e.--unless the small country is effectively closed). Open market
operations, on the other hand, can only alter the level of income if the
n 2
exchange rate is flexible. The attempt to develop a portfolio model
for a small country which is capable of dealing with the Assignment Problem
is then futile in a world of perfectly fixed exchange rates--the case in
which the balance of payments is a policy problem--since neither tradi
tional monetary nor fiscal policy can alter the level of income, and since
the balance of payments (if the system is stable) is self-correcting,
Section 11 - The Basic Model
The model postulates two countries--e.g. - the U.S. and the U.K.--
in which only two assets are held (money and bonds). Residents of a
country are assumed to hold only that country's money, whereas foreign
bonds can be held by domestics. It is assumed that the exchange rate is
kept permanently fixed and that capital markets are sufficiently integrated
such that asset holders are indifferent to holding domestic or foreign
bonds. Thus, there is a single world interest rate. In accord with the
McKinnon (1968) and Argy and Kouri (1974) monetary models of the balance
of payments, the Keynesian assumption of fixed commodity prices and
variable Income levels is made.^^
The U.S. private sector's demands for cash balances and bond holdings
are given by equations 1 and 2. These demands are functions of the current
level of U.S. disposable income, the real (equal to the nominal) rate of
return on bonds, and U.S. private sector wealth, ie. -
1) « L(Y^, r, W) Where; = private U.S. demand for cash
balances
2) =B^(Y^, r, W) «U.S. disposable income
and: r = rate of return on bonds
4t"
3) W= + M W » U.S. private sector wealth
= private U.S. demand for bonds
p
B = bond holdings of the U.S.
private sector
M = money holdings of the U.S.
private sector
At a moment in time, in which wealth is fixed, the balance sheet constraint
imposes certain sign restrictions on the asset demand functions. In particular,
as long as wealth is fixed, the sum of the asset demands must always be equal
to the given stock of wealth since it is impossible to allocate more assets
than the existing stock. The above condition will be met if the sum of the
effects of changes in the interest rate and changes in the level of income
both sum to zero across the portfolio, while the effect of a change in wealth
aL aB°sums to unity across the portfolio, i.e., ~ ^ 3r~ ~ ' ^
d d
By assumption: |^>0; |^ <0; and 0<||<1.
Similarly the U.K. demands for money and bonds can be represented by:
4) = L'(Yj, r, W) Where: Primed symbols represent the U.K.
counterpart of the U.S. variable.
5) r. W")
6) W = B'^ + M'
It is assumed that money has no backing, but the rules of the game are
such that there is a reserve asset in which international payments are made.
When a resident of a country receives the reserve asset, the central bank
Immediately exchanges the reserve asset for the domestic currency. Thus,
one component of each country's money supply is the cumulated sum--either
positive or negative--of the central bank's accumulations of the reserve
asset, each times the currency price of the reserve asset. If the currency
price of the reserve asset in both the U.S. and the U.K. Is set equal to
unity (necessitating an exchange rate equal to one), a component of each
country's money supply is equal to the central bank holdings' of the
reserve asset. The second component of a country's money supply is equal
to the cumulated sum of bonds purchased by the central bank since central
banks are assumed to purchase bonds only during open market operations.
Thus, the money supply in each country can be represented by:
7) M = + R Where: = cumulated sura of U.S. central
bank bond purchases
8) M' = B'^ + R'
R = dollar value of U.S. central bank
holdings of the reserve asset.
Since the world stock of the reserve asset is assumed fixed:
9) dR ^ -dR'
Each government is assumed to issue a fixed price bond, and since the
two bonds are viewed as perfect substitutes, bond market equilibrium requires:
10) B+ B' = B^ + B'^ + + B'^ Where: B - stock of bonds issued by the
U.S. government
B' = stock of bonds issued by the
U.K. government
The asset demand equations (equations l^S) describe the demands for
assets at a point in time wherein portfolio size is fixed. Over time,
however, the size of a portfolio need not be constant and, following Jones
(1968), it is assumed that saving is proportional to the discrepancy
between desired and actual wealth. Since the desired or target level of
wealth is positively related to both the level of disposable income and the
interest rate, saving behavior can be represented by:
11) W= a[W*(Y^, r) - W] Where: W* = desired wealth
9W* . , .^ ^
s a = marginal propensity to save
fa » constant of proportionality
A dot appearing over a variable
represents the time derivative of
that variable
12) W = a' r) - W] and: ^ > 0; ^ > 0; s < 1.
d
With saving behavior specified, the consumption or expenditure function
becomes a redundant equation, i.e.-
13) E = Y, - W Where: E - U.S, expenditures on the U.S,
^ and U.K. good
14) E' = - W^
Total consumption expenditures, by definition, sum to the demand for
the domestic good plus the demand for the foreign good. Given fixed commodity
prices and a fixed exchanged rate, the private demand for imports is solely a
function of private expenditures. The total demand for imports is the sum of
the private and government demands. If the private and government marginal
propensities to import are equal^^ total imports are solely a function of
private plus government expenditures. The balance of payments equation
condition states the change in the U.S. money supply due to the balance
of payments is equal to the difference between U.S. exports and imports,
plus net U.S. bond sales to the U.K.,^^i,e.-
• • *c 'P
15) R = X(E* + G*) - X'(E + G) + B - B - B Where: G « U.S. government
expenditures
X = U.S. exports =
U.K. imports
G') "^ ' propensity to
import
9X' _
3(E + G) = ^
propensity to
impor t
and: 0<m< 1; 0<m' < 1
Government Behavior
As each govertunent is assumed to finance a discrepancy between its
expenditures and revenues by bond issuance, the government budget
constraints become:
16) G - T = B Where: T = U.S. tax revenues
9
17) G' - T' = B'
Governments may desire to increase taxes by some porportion of any
increase in government expenditures; this behavior can be represented by;
18) T = tG Where: t » constant of proportionality
0 ^ t s 1
19) X' = t'G'
Fiscal policy involves determining the level of government expenditures
and the constant of proportionality between taxes and expenditures.
As in the Mundell model, the government can assign its deficit to
internal balance or to the balance of parents. An alternative assignment,
however, is to increase the government deficit when the country experiences
a balance of trade surplus. As pointed out in Section I, a balance of
trade surplus represents desired net saving. Since the government deficit
involves wealth creation, the government may decide to assign fiscal policy
to the balance of trade. The potential assignments of fiscal policy can
be represented by:^^
20) (1 - t)G = gj^BP + §28! Where: BP = U.S. balance of payments = R
+ g3(Y* - Y) BT = U.S. balance of trade = X - X'
21) (1 - t')G' = gj|BP' + g^BT' Y = U.S. income level « + T
+• g^CY** - Y') Y* = desired income level
g^ - positive constant (1 • 1, 3)
Note: BT = -BT' and BP « -BP'
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The policy instrument available to the monetary authorities is their
bond holdings, which can be assigned to internal balance, the balance of
payments or the balance of trade. The central bank may also attempt to
monetize the government deficit by purchasing a portion of the new bond
issuances. Thus, the potential assignments of monetary policy can be
represented by:
22) = m.BP+ m„BT Where: m^ = positive or negative constant
^ ^ . as the monetary authorities may
+ m [Y* - Y] + m.B sterilize or accommodate the
^ balance of parents. If they
sterilize -1 < m. < 0, If they
• ^
23) = m|BP' + m^BT' accommodate m^ > 0
+m^tY *- Y]+m^B ni2 6e m^ =positive constants
m, = positive constant where
0 ^ m, ^ 1. Note: increases
4
in m^ represent increases in
the amount of the government
deficit financed by money
issuance.
In the absence of policy active governments (i.e., =
- 0), the world stock of money and world stock of bonds are fixed.
Full stock equilibrium requires that desired portfolio size and composition
equal the actual amount and distribution of assets. Portfolio size within
a country will be constant if the balance of trade is zero; with a zero
trade balance, portfolio composition will be invarient over time if the
balance of payments equals zero. In Enders (1975) it is shown that the
system is unambiguously stable if 1- m- m* >0, ^ <0, and
i.e.- the sum of the marginal propensities to import
is less than unity and the long run demand for money is negatively related
18
to the interest rate. Given these two standard assumptions, the system
will converge to full stock equilibrium, although income levels need not be
11
the full employment levels of income. As shown in the Appendix, when Che
parametric values of corresponding U.S. and U.K. demands are equal, the
system is unambiguously stable. These results are not surprising since,
with constant levels of wealth, the asset flows operate as in the early
specie-flow models. In the absence of flexible prices, however, income
levels need not be consistent with full emplojment.
Section III - Policy Assignments and Stability
Since—in the absence of government Intervention—the equilibrium
levels of income attained may not be consistent with full employment,
income levels become targets to which governments may assign monetary
or fiscal policy. Governments, however, not only desire to promote
full employment but also desire to minimize the time needed to attain
full employment. Thus, we plan to determine how various assignments
affect stability, and how—for a given assignment—various policy
19
responses affect the speed of adjustment.
The potential assignments are given by equations 20-23; it is
possible to solve equations 1-23, obtain the characteristic roots of the
system and discuss how each g^ and m^ affects stability. We choose, however,
to follow a simpler course and first determine the stability properties of
pure assignments (in which each policy is assigned to only one target).
From the pure assignment case we then ascertain the effects of mixed
assignments. Even when pure assignments are considered, the characteristic
roots of the system are quite complicated expressions. The characteristic
roots, however, can be greatly simplified if it is assumed that the values
of corresponding government policy parameters are identical (i.e., g^ = g!^
and m, = ml). In order to simplify our presentation, the discussion in the
12
text of this section--unless otherwise n0ted--a8sumes that corresponding
government policy parameters are identical, while the effects of asym
metrical policy parameters are relegated to footnotes. Also, the discus
sion in the text and footnotes assumes that the parametric values in the
U.S. and U.K. asset and import demand equations are identical.
Case I - Fiscal Policy to Internal Balance, Monetary Policy to the Balance
of Payments
The first assignment under consideration is the one recommended in
Mundell (1962). In terms of equations 20-23, this assignment implies:
20a) (l-t)G = g^(Y* - Y); 21a) (1- t»)G* - g^(Y** - Y')
• « • •
22a) =m^BP +m^B; 23a) B'^ =m[BP' + m^B*
As can be determined from the appendix, the characteristic roots of
20
the dynamic system for this assignment are:
24) = -^[83(1 - t)(l - 2m) + 2m]-
[gjCl - t)(l - 2m) + 2ni +s(l - 2m)(l + tg^)]"'"
CT2 = -a(l - t)g2[W^([n^ - L^) - L^]-
[QW^Lyd +£83) - L^(g3(l - t) +s(l +tgg))]'^
If = 0 (deficit financed through bond issuance), then sufficient
conditions for stability are: a) 1 - 2m > 0: b) L + L W <0: and c)
r w r
t < 1, i.e.- if the sum of the marginal propensities to import are less than
unity, the long run demand for money is negatively related to the interest
rate and if governments do not maintain balanced budgets. Conditions
a) and b) are standard, and can be expected to be fulfilled. If t = 1,
0^ = 0 and income levels do not converge to full employment. This result
13
follows from viewing insufficient aggregate demand as being caused by a
deficiency in total wealth stocks. That is, at full employment, an
insufficient level of wealth will cause a reduction in total expenditures
and a corresponding reduction in income levels. Incomes will fall until
the demand for wealth is equal to the stock of wealth. Thus, changes in
government expenditures—unless permanently maintained—not accompanied by
wealth changes will not promote full employment. From equation 25 it is also
possible to determine how changes in the policy parameters influence the
speeds of adjustment. As is apparent, the more responsive is fiscal policy
(i.e., the larger is g^) the faster is the speed of adjustment; and the
21
speed of adjustment is negatively related to the tax rate.
Although government expenditures undertaken to stabilize the econany
should--as in a Keynesian world—be financed by wealth creation, it is
possible to inquire whether the government deficits should be financed by
money or bond creation. In considering the effects of changing (the
extent to which debt is monetized), it is apparent that one characteristic
root (a^) is independent of m^, while the absolute value of the other root
(a^) varies directly with m^. Since represents the speed of convergence
of the balance of trade and payments (see footnote 21), debt management only
affects the speed of adjustmeot of Income levels. Upon reflection, this
result should be obvious as the balance of trade represents desired net
saving or dissaving and monetizing the debt alters only the form of wealth
creation. Monetizing the debt will, however, affect the speed at which
income levels converge since, as in Keynesian models, monetizing the government
debt is more expansionary than financing government expenditures through bond
issuance. In our model monetizing the government debt is expansionary, as it
induces a lower interest rate, leading to decreases in desired wealth, and
increases in expenditures.
14
Finally, consider the effect—or lack of effect--of monetary policy to
the Balance of Payments, As seen from (24), as long as full sterilization
does not occur, the degree of sterilization or accomodation of the Balance
of Payments has no effect on stability or speeds of convergence. Thus,
contrary to most received doctrine, it is not true that sterilization is
22
destabilizing.
Although the results obtained above are predicated upon the governments
adopting the same policy response parameters, similar results hold in other
cases. For example, if sterilization rates are the same = rap» while
the degree of monetization and the fiscal policy response parameters differ,
23
the system is stable if:
a) 1 - 2m > 0; b) L + L W < inln[m,W , m'M]; and c) g. > 0 or g' > 0
^ rwr 4r4r j j
Thus, if the sum of the marginal propensities to import is less than unity
and if the long run money demand function is inversely related to the interest
rate, stability is insured as long as one country pursues fiscal stabilization
policy.
Furthermore, even if sterilization rates differ, the system will be
24stable (if a, b, and c hold), provided g^ « g^. In this case, one charac
teristic root (that corresponding to the Balance of Trade), aj^, is the same
as in (24); the other root becomes:
(25) = -ff(l-t)g2[(m^(l+inp + m^(l-KQj^) - L^(2+m^-knp)W^ - L^(2+mj^+mp]
(2+m^-finp[QW^L^(l+tg3) " + s(l+tg^))] "
Frcxn (25) it is apparent that even if one country fulfy sterilizes (mj^ =* ~l),
the system will still be stable provided [(m^ - L^)W^ - L^] > 0, -1.
15
Though sterilization rates do alter stability in this case, they can either
lower,or increase the speeds of convergence. In particular:
r ^^2"I r(26) -signj^ = sign [^(1 + mp (m^ - m^)
•If both countries monetize debt at the same rate, sterilization again
is irrelevant, if m^ ^ m^, then the country with the lower monetization
rate should accpmodate its Balance of Payments surplus (or deficit), whereas
25
the:other should sterilize. The explanation for this result is that if
there is deficient (excessive) aggregate demand, the country with the higher
monetization rate will run a Balance of Payments deficit (surplus). If the
country with, the deficit (surplus) sterilizes and the surplus (deficit)
country accommodates, the world money supply is increased (decreased), thus
speeding convergence towards full employment equilibrium.
Thus,' while sterilization may affect speeds of convergence if monetary
policies.differ, there is certainly no presumption that sterilization retards
adjustment. Moreover, the preceding analysis implies that convergence is
enhanced by financing government expenditures through money creation. When
both governments finance their deficits via monetary issuance, monetary policy
is impotent in altering the speed of adjustment of the balance of payments.
That this should be so, even if sterilization rates differ, is a truly
26
remarkable result.
Case II Fiscal Policy to Income, Monetary Policy to the Balance of Trade
This assignment is one that cannot be discussed in small country models
because of the one to one relationship between domestic income and the balance
of trade. In terms of equations 20-23, this assignment can be represented
by:
16
20b) (1 - t)G = s^Vi* - 21b) (1 - t')G' = g^[Y'* - Y']
22b) = m2BT + 23b) = m^BT' + ra^B'
From the results of the previous section, we intuitively expect monetary
policy to be impotent when directed towards the Balance of Trade, as it is
when directed towards the Balance of Payments. In fact, when corresponding
government policy parameters are equal, the characteristic roots for the
two assignments are identical!
Since the effects of various parameters on convergence have been
discussed in detail, there is little point in repeating this exercise.
Suffice it to say that convergence is enhanced by financing the government
deficit through monetary issuance, rather than by bond issuance or taxes.
It is also not surprising to find that monetary policy directed toward the
balance of trade is impotent. As long as m^ - m^, the world money supply
is unaltered by such policy actions, hence the assignment of money to the
27
balance of trade cannot have any lasting effect on the econOTiic system.
Case III - Fiscal Policy to the Balance of Trade. Monetary Policy to Income
Again, this represents an assignment that is meaningful only in a multi-
country model. As noted earlier, Balance of Trade disequilibria represent
an Improper distribution of the existing stock of wealth; in particular, a
surplus implies a larger excess demand for wealth in the surplus country
than the deficit country. Thus, it seems appropriate to apply fiscal policy
to this target. Wealth, then, will be increased in the country with the
balance of trade surplus and decreased in the country with the balance of
trade deficit.
Also, aggregate unemployment represents an excess of wealth demand
(at full employment) over the existing wealth stock; one way to accomodate
17
this problem is to increase wealth stocks (a policy pursued in the first
two assignments). An alternative policy is to lessen wealth demand at
full employment. Monetary policy can reduce the demand for wealth since
increases in world money supplies lower interest rates, leading to decreased
desires to hoard and thus increased spending. Therefore, unlike the previous
assignments, we expect both tools to influence the stability of the system.
In terms of equations 20-23, this assignment can be represented by:
20c) (1 - t)G = g2BT; 21c) ( 1 - f)G' = gpT'
22c) - Y] + 23c) B'*^ =m^[Y'* - VM + m^B'
From the Appendix it is readily seen that the characteristic roots
28
for this assignment are:
(27) CT^= -2atn[l +(l-t)g2] [2m(l -f (l-t)g2) +s(l-2m(l-tg2)) ]"^
[aW^L^ - sL^] ^
There are several noteworthy features of this assignment. First, note
that both monetary and fiscal policy matter; fiscal policy (g^) affects the
convergence of the Balance of Trade, monetary policy affects aggregate
demand (footnote 28). Moreover, the system is unambiguously stable; no
condition on the long run money demand function or on the sum of the marginal
propensities to import is needed. Finally, the system is stable even if
g2 = 0 or t = 1. The fact that it is stable for = 0 reflects the self-
correcting nature of balance of trade disequilibria.
As in previous assignments, higher tax rates retard the speed of
adjustment (for g2 > 0); this occurs because higher tax rates decrease the
impact of government purchases on the stock of wealth. However, as noted
18
above, the system is stable even under balanced budget financing because
trade disequilibria tend to correct themselves, and because taxes, through
lowering disposable income, decrease wealth demands, thereby partially
offsetting the causes of Balance of Trade disequilibria.
Turning to fiscal expenditures (g^)) it is seen they have no impact
on aggregate demand (.^2^ * this is apparent since government expenditures
are not directed towards this target and because, in the symmetric case,
no net wealth is created. Thus, there can be no impact of fiscal policy
on aggregate demand. The effect of fiscal policy on the Balance of Trade
turns out to be ambiguous, depending on import propensities and tax rates.
Thus:
r Ho,)
(28) sign j = -sign [1 - 2111 - t];
for t - 0, larger g^ increases convergence if 2ra < 1. This follows from
the fact that if 2m > 1, U.K. government spending has a larger impact on
U,S. income than does U.S. government spending. Thus the assignment of
fiscal policy proves counterproductive. Further, since higher tax rates
lower the efficacy of government spending, it follows that this assignment
of fiscal policy can retard convergence if import propensities and tax
rates are large.
The effects of monetary policy are straightforward; expansionary monetary
policy (large m^) is always stabilizing because of the effect of a change in
the interest rate on wealth. Further, monetary policy has no impact on
Balance of Trade adjustment is intuitive, monetization of the debt
(ra^) is irrelevant because no new wealth is created.
The case in which the magnitudes of policy responses differ presents
no special problem in this assignment. Assuming only the same tax rates
19
in each country, the characteristic roots are readily calculated from the
i^pendix:
-2crai [ 1+ (l-t/^2 ^2^.
(29) -
2m[; 1+ t
=-QW^(n>3 +m^)[2(QW^Ly - sL^)]"^
The close relation between (29) and (27) is apparent, and thus it is not
necessary to repeat the analysis of the effects of various policies on
stability. We just note that stability remains assured and that debt
monetization does not matter. This latter follows because, even though
there may be wealth creation in the asynunetric case, there is no relation
between aggregate demand equilibrium and Balance of Trade equilibrium.
To conclude, this assignment is, in some sense, the most stable since
no assumptions are needed on the long run money demand function or marginal
propensities to import. Further, both instruments affect convergence in
this assignment. As in previous assignments, it is inappropriate to
couple taxes with stabilizing government expenditures. However, the impact
of fiscal policy on stability depends on the sum of the marginal propensities
to import (for t = 0); if no presumption exists as to the magnitudes of
these parameters, no conclusions emerge as to the efficacy of fiscal policy,
(Note that for previous assignments instability could result if 2m > 1),
Case IV - Monetary Policy to Income, Fiscal Policy to the Balance of Payments
This assignment, which is the anti-Mundell assignment, seems the most
likely to be unstable. While monetary policy is coupled with a target for
which it is effective, fiscal policy is not so paired. To the extent a
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Balance of Payments surplus Is due to transitory capital flows, expansionary
fiscal policy can be destabilizing as an increase (decrease) in the stock
of bonds in the surplus (deficit) country will increase (decrease) the demand
for money, aggravating the balance of payments.
This policy can be represented by:
20d) (1 - t)G = g^BP; 21d) (1 - t')G* - g[ BP
22d) =^3!^* - Y] =m^B 23d) B''^ = - Y'] + m^B'
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For this assignment there are three characteristic roots; the one
corresponding to Income levels is:
30) a. « -qW m-[QW L - sL ] ^ < 0
'1 r 3 r y r
which means aggregate demand converges towards equilibriian. The other two
roots are the solutions to the following quadratic:
31) a\ygj^[l - t - 2m] +CT (1 - t - 2m) (o-L^gj^ + +
(1 - t +st)g^m2(l - 2m) - |(1 +gj^(l - t)m^)(2m +8(1 - 2m)j-l
+ ffKl - 2m)(l - t)gj^m2 - 2m(l +(1 - t)gj^m^)] = 0.
For g^ = 0, the quadratic is degenerate, and the system is stable; the root
obtained is identical to that for g2 = 0 in the previous assignment. However,
for gj^ 3^ 0, the stability of the system is in doubt; it depends upon the




Thus far we have concentrated upon pure assignments, in which an instru
ment is paired with a single target. However, mixed assignments are also
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easily investigated because of the assumed linearity of the system around
equilibrium. As we have just shown, the assignment of fiscal policy to the
Balance of Payments can introduce instability into the system. However,
other mixed assignments will, in general, be stable. The characteristic
roots for the mixed policy assignment, under the assumption ~
and government response parameters are the same in each country (g^ = gj^;
,, 31mi » mp are:
-[2Qim + 2am(l - t)g^ + cv(l - 2m) (1 - t)g^]
^1 " [8(1 - 2m) + 2m + amg^d - t + st) + g^Cl - 2m)(l - t + st)
+ (1 - "V " ^r^^
^2 " *^^3^ " ^r^® + (1 - t +
The properties discussed previously hold for the mixed assignment. Some of
the more important results can be summarized as follows: a) stability is
assured if g^ = 0 and m^ > 0; b) monetary policy assigned to the Balance of
Trade or Payments has no impact on speeds of convergence; c) financing
fiscal stabilization policy by taxes retards convergence; d) if fiscal
policy is used to stabilize aggregate demand, these expenditures should be
financed via money creation (or contraction); e) monetary policy only affects
aggregate demand; because of perfect capital markets it has no effect on the
stability and convergence of the Balance of Trade or Payments; f) larger
rates of fiscal policy towards aggregate demand increases speed of convergence
towards aggregate demand equilibrium if (W (m, -L) -L)>0, and increases
IT ^ V? r
the speed of convergence towards Balance of Trade equilibrium if (1 - 2m)
(1- 2m - t) > 0; g) fiscal policy towards the Balance of Trade has no effect
on aggregate demand, but increases in ificrease convergence towards Balance
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of Trade equilibrium if (1 - 2m - t) > 0; and h) increases in always
increase Che speed of convergence towards aggregate demand equilibrium.
All of these results can be viewed as a synthesis of the properties of the
pure assignment cases.
Section IV - Conclusion
In this paper we have explored the assignment problem in a two country
model in which the demand for wealth, as well as the portfolio composition
of wealth, represent stock, rather than flow decisions. In small country
versions of this model (as well as in Keynesian models, if it is not
possible to sustain Balance of Trade disequilibria over the long run)
both monetary and fiscal policy are impotent in affecting the equilibrium
income level because stock equilibrium requires Balance of Trade equilibrium.
Thus, in such small country models expenditure switching policies (exchange
rate changes, tariffs, differential government propensities to Import) are
required to alter domestic income.
However, we feel that it is more appropriate, particularly for the
developed countries of the Western world, to investigate such issues in an
interdependent setting. In this context we have found that either monetary
or fiscal policy can alter income levels and that, because of the inherent
adjustments caused by Balance of Trade or Payments disequilibria, only one
target (aggregate demand) does not necessarily converge to the target level.
In investigating various assignments we have shown that, provided some
instrument is assigned to income, the system tends to be stable, if fiscal
policy is not assigned to Balance of Payments equilibrium. While it is
difficult to state which assignment is "best", since this entails comparing
rates of expansion of the money supply to rates of government spending, in
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son.e sense the most appropriate assignment appears to be to assign fiscal
policy to Balance of Trade dlsequillbria and monetary policy to income.
we say that this is "most appropriate" both because it represents an
assignment of instruments according to the causes of dlsequillbria, and
because it is stable under a wider range of values for the underlying
parameters.
To the extent that we adopt this latter assignment, our conclusions
differ from Mundell's for the obvious reason that we view capital movements
as stock adjustments, rather than sustainable flows. On the other hand,
our results are consistent with those of Tsiang (1975. 207). In his paper.
Tsiang argues that fiscal policy should be assigned to Balance of Payments
equilibrium, once it is purged of transitory capital flows. However, since
he does not view wealth holdings as a stock decision, his model allows
wealth stocks to permanently grow, even though real income does not. If
no sustainable capital flows are possible (as is the case if wealth stocks
do not grow), then his assignment reduces to ours. Of course, it should
be noted that, even in the context of his own model. Tsiang provides no
suggestions as to how policy makers can distinguish "volatile" transitory
capital flows from what he perceives as sustainable flows.
Perhaps our most Interesting results concern the use of monetary policy
Mundell argues that monetary policy should be assigned to the Balance of
payments; this follows from his flow specification of the model. Other
authors (Aliber 1974. Argy and Kouri 1974). even those working implicitly
in the context of stock adjustment models have argued that sterilization
retards adjustment, and that policy makers should accomodate Balance of
Payments dlsequillbria. Tsiang. (1975. 211) on the other hand, argues
that "it would seem advisable to sever... the link between domestic money
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supply and the balance of payments," However, these results have all been
developed in the context of one country models. In our paper we find that
sterilization policy, provided both countries do not fully sterilize, has
no impact on the speed of adjustment towards equilibrium.
All of our analysis has been conducted in the context of perfect
capital markets; it would seem that a logical extension of this work would
be to consider how "imperfections" in international capital markets affect
these results. While many models have assumed imperfect capital mobility,
little explanation has been given for the cause of this imperfection, and the
degree of capital mobility has been taken as exogenous. Since it seems that
such imperfections arise due to risks perceived by investors (such as exchange
risk), and since the risk could well be treated as an endogenous variable
(say, as reflected in international reserve holdings), we are currently
attempting to expand this model to incorporate endogenous risk and imperfect
capital mobility into it. We feel that this represents an appropriate






Equations 1-23 do not constitute a set of 23 independent equations as
equations 1-6 contain only four independent equations. By omitting the
two dependent bond demand equations, the remaining 21 equations can be
solved as follows:
a) Equate all asset demands and asset supplies
b) Since dR = -dR', it follows that R' = -(R + c) where c = a constant
of integration. Substitute -(R + c) for R*.
c) Substitute equations 13 and 14 into equation 15.
d) Substitute equation 18 and 19 into 16 and 17 and into the definitions
of disposable income.
The following nine equations plus equations 10, 11, 12 and 20-23 con
stitute a set of sixteen independent equations and sixteen unknowns.
la) B + R
P c
3a) W « B + B + R;
Sa) BP = BT + B - B^ - B^
6a) - Y - tG
8a) (1 - t)G = B
L(Y^, W); 2a) B' - R - c = L'(Y* r, w')
P c
4a) W = B' •+ B' - R - c
7a) Y^ = Y' - t'G'
9a) (1 - t')G' = B'
WHERE: BT = X(Y^ - W' + G') - (Y^ - W+ G)
BP = i
Of the sixteen independent variables (Y, Y', Y^, Y^> G, G', B, B*, W, W,
B'^, B^, B'^, Rand r) only seven of these variables appear with time
• ••••• •
derivatives (W, W', B, B", B^, B*^, R). Notice that a') it is possible to
substitute (1 - t)G for Band (1 - t')G' for B'; b') W+ W = B^ + B'^ +
B^ + B'® - c. Thus, W + W « B^ + B
follows that W + W = B + B', Hence, W = (1 - t)G + (1 - t')G' - W; c*)
from equations 11, 12, 22 and 23: B'^ = (m^^ - nij,)R + (m^ -
(m^ + m^)[Y* + Y'* - Y' - Y' ] + m^(l - t)G + m^(l - t')G' - Steps
a', b* and c* show that the system can be written with only three variables
containing time derivatives. Thus, the system can be written in terras of
three differential equations. Any possible assignment, then, will contain
no more than three characteristic roots in the general form of the solution.
Linearizing the system around equilibrium and using the Jacobian matrix,
the system can be solved for Y, Y' and R, Applying elementary row trans
formations to this matrix yields the following characteristic matrix:
+ B*^ + B'^ and from equation 10 it
11 12 13 y - y
Where: y s -(y* - Y)
10a)
21 22 23 y + y
=: 0 y' = -(Y'* - Y')
31 32 33
R R B U.S. reserves
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Note that y(y') represents the deviation of actual from desired income and
that exchange rates are compatible with full employment (see footnote 17)
so that mY* = The sum of the deviations (y + y') measures the state
of world inflationary or recessionary pressure. Since the composition of
world wealth will be determined by differences in income levels, y - y'
is a proxy for the balance of trade. The above follows as the balance of
trade will be zero if y = y'; for there to be no inflationary or recessionary
pressure y + y' must equal zero.
The nine elements of the matrix 10a) are as follows:
a) ^i = ^Ly 1 +
tm
1 - 2m '®2(So + So) + 2 ^ J 2 J
*Cr:^ [("2 "P - +82 K
(1 - t) _S3(n.4 - - L^)J
aL t p
(ii) ^ 1^83 - 33 p
-ml-,
V 2 ^ _S3^®4 • " ^3(014 -
r(lit) a^3 = t(g^ + gp - 2 -(m^ +m|) - (1 - - L^) + g^(m^ - L^)_l
(iv) a^^ " a
^ (1 - t + st)m(g + gp (1 - t + st)(g^ + gp ^
s + •: + — :r-: +
1 - 2m (1 - 2m)
2m
+ a\ ^ s— +
mi(1 - t)(g2 + gp (1 - t)(g^ + g^)
.1 - 2m ' 1 - 2m 2
(V) ^ <^3 -®3^ +2ll^ (83 " g^)
(VI) a23 = - a(l - t + St) + a(l - t) (§3^ + g;)
(vii)
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= -aCoW^tL - L^(l - t + 3t))(;^—






(m -mpW - (l-t)L^(m2-mp + (l-t)W |^g2(in^-L^)-g^(m^-L„) 1j
-|[Wr(m3-mp - L^(l-t) (gj-g') +W^(l-C) jgj (m^-L^)-g'(m^-L^) 1J
+ sisL^ - aW^Ly - - (1 - t +st)Lj, ](viii) ^
W^Cm3-hn^)-(l-t)L^(g3+g^)+(l-t)W^lg3(ra^-L^)-g^(m^-L^)}_
(ix) 833 == a(gj^ - gp(0!W^tL - (1 - t + st)L^)
+a W^(mj^-mp-(l-t)L^(g^-gp+(l-t)W^jgj^(m^-L^)-g[(m^-L^)!_
Section II contained a discussion of the stability of the system when
governments set all g. = gl — ~ This discussion did not assume
identical parameters of corresponding U.S. and U.K. asset demand functions,
and the derivation of these results is given in Enders (1975). In the
symmetric case the sole root for the system is:
cr^ =-2Qtn[s(l - 2m) +2m] ^which is un^biguously negative as the marginal
propensity to save is less than unity. Returning to the case in which
governments are policy active, note that if 2m = 1, the system is degenerate.
The symmetry of the model--for m= l/2--implies Y = Y' so y* - y is identically
zero.
The characteristic roots presented in the text are obtained from the
characteristic equation of 10a. Note that this specification allows us to
consider mixed assignments. The symmetric case (g^ - gj^, = mp In which
g^ = gj^ = 0 (fiscal policy is not assigned to the Balance of Payments) is
particularly simple since a^^^ ~ ^22 ~ ^23 ~ ^31 ~ ^33 ~ this case the
characteristic equation is a quadratic (if m^ = ml^ -1) and the roots are
obtained from a^^^ = 0; = 0. Moreover, the root from corresponds to
y'- y (BD and R(BP), whereas the root for a32 corresponds to (y' + y) i.e.,
aggregate demand. All of our results in section III come frcm solving the
characteristic equation (and the associated characteristic roots and vectors)
from 10a) in both synanetric and asymmetric cases.
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Footnotes
1. Fostin (1975) discusses the breakdown of this principle in the n
target, n instrument case.
2. See, for example, Tobin (1969), Tobin and Brainard (1968), or
Markowitz (1959).
3. See, for example, Levin (1972), Patrick (1968), Floyd (1972) or
Roper (1971).
4. This point is made by Aghevli and Sorts (1974), and implied by
Johnson (1972). The reader should note the obvious similarity
between these recent arguments and the Hume specie-flow mechanism.
5. One of the first authors to stress the importance of this point was
Johnson (1961). It is important to distinguish between the wealth
increasing nature of a balance of trade surplus and the asset
substitution effect of a balance of pajnnents surplus. The confusion
between the two is exemplified by Mussa (1974, 338) who states:
"The monetary approach emphasizes that as a fact of accounting the
balance of payments surplus is identically equal to the excess of
income over expenditure."
6. See, for example, Johnson (1972), Boyer (1975), Girton and Henderson
(1975), Frenkel and Rodriquez (1975) Itomiya (1969), or Mussa (1974).
7. Jones (1968).
8. Girton and Henderson (1975).
9. See, Girton and Henderson (1975) or Boyer (1975).
10. As the life cycle and permanent income hypotheses imply individuals
desire to hold a terminal stock of wealth. See Modiglicni and
Brumberg (1954) or Friedman (1957).
11. Many authors, such as Tsiang, seem to ignore considerations of
how government purchases are financed, and thus miss the wealth
creation effects of government deficits and the problem as to how
such deficits should be financed.
12. Mathieson (1975) demonstrated that by controlling the required
reserve ratio, the monetary authorities, in a small country, could
gain a degree of monetary control. Aside from the instititutional
constraints and the reluctance of central banks to alter reserve
ratios, this finding is not relevant to the Assignment Problem. As
fiscal policy cannot alter the level of income, the reserve ratio
necessarily must be assigned to internal balance in a small country.
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13. The model Is easily adaptable to allow residents of each country to
hold two monies.
14. Johnson(1972) stated that the monetary approach to the balance of
payments necessarily assumes full employment and flexible prices.
Mussa (1975), Argy and Kouri (1974) and McKinnon (1968), however,
used monetary models with fixed prices and variable income levels.
15. This assumption can be relaxed and each government's marginal
propensity to import can be treated as a policy instrument. However,
the assumption used in the text is consistent with much of the work
concerning the effects of tariffs on the terms of trade and can be
rationalized by assuming residents consider government purchases
in making their own consumption decisions.
16. The difficulties involved with incorporating interest payments are
well known to macro-theorists. It is not our intent to tackle these
problems here. Rather we assume that each government sterlizes the
international interest payments, via lump sum taxes. Interest
payments, then do not appear in equation 15 nor do they add to
disposable income. Obviously, it must be assumed that the amount of
tax any individual pays is not commensurate with that individuals
holdings of bonds. Readers interested in this point are referred to
Levin (1972) and Tsiang (1975), although we do not believe that
these authors have handled this problem successfully.
17. We assume that the fixed exchange rate is such that the desired
income levels are consistent with steady state equilibrium. This
assumption must be made in any model where sustainable capital
flows are not viable. Since the underlying structural parameters
are not known it is an interesting, but separate,issue to determine
when governments should adjust exchange rates, assuming such adjustments
are costly.
18. The condition that l-2m > 0 is a familiar one from the literature
on the transfer problem, and the secondary burden of a transfer, if
prices are flexible. It arises in this model because imports depend
on expenditures, not income.
19. It is difficult to compare speeds of adjustment for different
assignments since this entails comparing response parameters of
monetary and fiscal policy.
20» Subscripts denote partial differentiaion, e.g.
3L ^ . 3L _ T .
9y ° y' r* 3r ' r'
21. Note that if 2m = 1, g, does not affect o . As shown in the appendix,
when g^ = and = m^, it is possible to partition the system.
In this case is the characteristic root corresponding to the balance
of trade and payments, and corresponds to income levels. If 2m = 1,
g^ does not affect or the balance of trade or payments. If t = 1,
does not affect a^, or the level of income.
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22, Sterilizing or accommodating the balance of payments will, however,
affect the equilibrium distribution of reserves, see Enders (1975).
Our result in the text follows from allowing mj^= mj*. Under this
assumption the world money supply is fixed, i.e., the increase in the^
world money supply due to sterilization is m^BP + m^BP . Since m^ = m^^
and BP =-BP', the world money supply is fixed. The case in which
m^ ^ mj^ is discussed below.
23, For this case, the characteristic equation of the system is rather
complicated, and the roots are not easily simplified. These roots
are readily obtained from the Appendix and are omitted here to
save space. The conditions shown in the text can, however, be shown
to be sufficient conditions for stability by examining the coefficients
of the quadratic. Note that for m, = m! ^ 0, conditions a, b and c
reduce to the earlier conditions for stability. Also note that if only
die country responds to unemployment (i.e., either g^ or g^ ®
system still converges to the full employment income level for each
country.
2A. If all policies differ, the model becomes quite complex. It is
possible to show that stability will hold; but comparative statics
results are difficult to obtain in this case.
25. Note that if one country fully sterilizes, the other country's monetary
policy towards the Balance of Payments is irrevelant.
26. Since monetary policy to the Balance of Payments affects only the
convergence towards full employment, and not the Balance of Trade
or Payments, sterilization is irrevelant in this case. This follows
from the absence of a connection between the state of world aggregate
demand and the Balance of Payments position of each country. Note
that this assumes that m, = ml.
4 4
27. Even if policy response parameters differ the system will, in general,
be stable; however, the general case is quite complex, and the
characteristic roots are irrational. If fiscal policy response
parameters are the same (g^ = quadratic is readily solvable;
one root is the same as in (24); the other is:
"2 = [aW^ (l+tg^) - (g^d-t) + sd+tg^))]
Again, it is clear full monetization of the debt promotes stability,
but that otherwise monetary policy is impotent (even for m^ mp-
28. As in previous assignments, corresponds to the speed of
convergence of the Balance of Trade and Payments, whereas
corresponds to convergence of aggregate demand. This is seen by
considering the eigenvector corresponding to each root.
29. These roots can be obtained from the Appendix. Note that previous
assignments yielded degenerate cubic characteristic equations in
that these were only two roots. From the eigenvector, it can be seen
that the roots of 31 correspond to the Balance of Trade and Payments
account.
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30. The case of asynnnetrlc government response parameters is even more
complicated, and little can be said about the stability of the system.
However, the uncertainty attached to the properties of this assign
ment, and the inability to conclude that this assignment is stable is
sufficient to allow us to conclude, as Mundell does, that such an
assignment is inappropriate.
31. The asymmetric mixed assignment will, in general, yield a cubic
equation that is difficult to analyze. These roots, again, can be
obtained from the Appendix. As before, corresponds to the Balance
of Trade and Payments and to aggregate demand.
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